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I ntrod u ctio n 
In January of 1975, Iowa Democratic Party activists and office holders 
could not have been happier. In the previous November's mid-term elections, 
Iowans had elected or reelected five of the six Democratic candidates for the 
U.S. House of Representatives, including newcomers Michael Blouin, Berkley 
Bedell, and Tom Harkin.1 In addition, Democrats now controlled both 
branches of the state legislature. About the only thing for the state's 
Democrats to be unhappy about was the situation in the Iowa Executive Council, 
where the GOP controlled all seven offices (including that of governor).2 
Even so, what probably excited loyal Democrats more than anything else was 
the election of former Second District Congressman John C. Culver to the 
United States Senate.3 The Culver election, coupled with the election two 
years earlier of Culver's legislative assistant Dick Clark over then-incumbent 
Sen. Jack Miller, marked only the second time in the state's history that two 
Democrats had been elected in the same decade to the highest legislative body 
in the nation.4 Iowa had finally become a competitive two-party state. 
What those jubilant Iowa Democrats did not know was that, within six 
years, Iowa's two liberal Democratic senators would be replaced by two 
conservative Republicans as a result of the 1978 and 1980 elections. Possible 
reasons for the 1972 and 197 4 victories of Clark and Culver and their 
1 Pam Peglow, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1975-1976 Vol. 56 (Des Moines, Iowa: The 
State of Iowa, 1975), 161-163. 
2 1bid., 164-169. 
3 1bid., 160-161. 
4Betty Lamberto, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1967-1968 Vol. 52 (Des Moines, Iowa: The 
State of Iowa, 1967), 366-367. Iowa voters elected three Democrats to serve in the U.S. Senate 
during the 1930s, Louis Murphy, Guy M. Gillette, and Clyde L. Herring. 
2 
subsequent defeats in 1978 and 1980 will be the focus of this paper. Limited 
background information about Clark and Culver will be utilized to familiarize 
the reader with the two candidates. Through the use of newspaper articles and 
public opinion polls from the Des Moines Register, the author will attempt to 
explore the situational context of each of the four races. Maps and charts will 
show the geographical distribution and characteristics of the vote as well as a 
way to link various demographic characteristics, such as urban/rural, 
ethnicity, and religion (especially considering the alleged importance of the 
issue of abortion and religion in politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s) 
with noticible shifts of voters to or from either candidate from one election to 
the next.5 In addition, resources such as The Congressional Quarterly Guide 
to Current American Government will help to put national perspective on the 
elections. In the interest of clarity, the election and defeat of Clark will be 
discussed before the election and defeat of Culver. Throughout the Culver 
section, then, the author will look for similarities and differences between the 
two candidates and their election contests. 
Dick Clark and the Elections of 1972 and 1978 
The story of Dick Clark's 1972 success in the race for the U.S. Senate is 
the classic story of "home-town boy makes good." Clark was born shortly 
before the Great Depression on his grandfather's farm in Linn County. After his 
family moved to the Buchanan County town of Lamont in 1938, Clark spent most 
of his childhood and teenage years helping his parents run their general store. 
He was also an exceptional athlete in high school, playing baseball well enough 
to be considered by a scout of the St. Louis Cardinals.6 
5Unless otherwise noted, the percentages in this paper have been compiled and tallied by the 
author. 
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Following a short stint as a truck driver, Clark attended Upper Iowa 
University in Fayette. Although his college career was interrupted by the 
outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Clark managed to finish school and later enroll 
in graduate studies at the University of Iowa in 1954 to study European 
history .7 The Clark that emerged from college and military service (he added 
fluency in German and Russian to his knowledge of European history) differed 
markedly from the Clark who had never excelled academically in high school. 
After receiving his M.A. in history, he returned to Upper Iowa University to 
teach Russian, history, and political science.8 Clark also served as a 
Democratic precinct captain in Fayette. 
As a result of the success of his election-day canvassing in Fayette, 
Clark was introduced to Second District Congressional Candidate John Culver 
and, subsequently, became Culver's most important assistant from his first 
congressional campaign in 1964 until Clark left his staff in 1971. 9 As 
Culver's chief assistant, Clark spent most of his time in Cedar Rapids rather 
than Washington, D.C., continuously gauging local political sentiment, informing 
Culver of community developments in the Second District, and helping to build 
a successful constituent-service network system.1 o In this way, Clark 
became well-known to party activists in the area. 
Most Iowa Democrats expected Culver to challenge incumbent Sen. Jack 
Miller for the Senate in 1972 and Clark to succeed Culver as Second District 
6James Flansburg, "The Story of Dick Clark's Success," Des Moines Register, 12 
November 1972, 1 (B) and 3 (B). 
71bid. 
81bid. 
9James C. Larew, A Party Reborn: The Democrats of Iowa. 1950-1974 (Iowa City, Iowa: 
Iowa State Historical Department, Division of the State Historical Society, 1980), 143-144. Also 
Flansburg, 3 (B). 
10Larew, 157. 
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Congressman. After researching the idea and deciding that Miller was too 
entrenched politically to be challenged successfully, Culver publicly announced 
that he would not be a candidate for the Senate. Less than two weeks 
following Culver's surprise announcement, Clark declared his own candidacy for 
the Senate. 11 Clark apparently was encouraged by the absence of a bitter 
primary fight for the nomination (as a result of the assumption that Culver 
would be the automatic nominee) and the vulnerable voting record of Miller, 
which Clark had researched for Culver in 1971. 
Literally unknown outside the Second District, Clark waged an underdog 
campaign from the beginning, attacking Miller's record on Vietnam, Medicare, 
Social Security, insurance rates, and the eighteen year-old vote.12 In the 
closing days of the campaign Clark launched a blistering attack on Miller, 
accusing him of being beholden to special interests in the insurance 
industry. 13 The weekend before the election, the Register predicted that 
Miller would win by a margin of 52-47%, but a closer look at the Iowa Polls 
conducted by the paper shows that Clark had been gaining on Miller since May, 
as indicated in the graph on the following page.14 
When all the votes were counted, Clark had upset Miller by garnering 
55.5% of the two-party vote. 15 In the days following the election, Clark 
11 Ibid., 169. 
12 Ibid., 170. 
13William Simbro, "Clark Credits Success to His 1,300-Mile Hike," Des Moines Register, 
8 November 1972, 7 (A). 
14Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1971-1972 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines 
Register, 1972), 522, 538, 551, and 556. In all the graphs containing head-to-head races, the 
polls with asterisks denote the final numbers that the Register predicted for each candidate based on 
the leanings of the remaining undecided voters. 
15L. Dale Ahern, ed., Iowa Official Register. 1973-1974 Vol. 55 (Des Moines, Iowa: The 
State of Iowa, 1973), 162-163. 
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attributed his success to his now-famous 1,300-mile walk across the state 
during the summer of 1972.16 The walk itself, during which he donned a khaki 
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safari outfit, apparently gave Clark enough visibility to overcome his unknown 
status and Miller's edge in statewide name recognition. In addition, the Qll 
Moines Register credited other factors for Clark's success, such as the 
aforementioned well-placed attacks on Miller and the fact that Clark's 
campaign war chest, at over $200,000, was incredibly well-stocked for a 
challenger. 17 Clark also benefitted from the first ever attempt of the Iowa 
Democratic Party to initiate a voter identification and get-out-the-vote 
drive.1 8 In addition to Clark's victory, Democrats won three of the six House 
races and provided George McGovern with 41 % of the state's popular vote, his 
16Simbro. 
17 James Flansburg, "Ray Is Easy Winner for Reelection, Close Race for Neu, Gannon," Oil 
Moines Register, a November 1972, 7 (A). 
18Larew, 170-171 . 
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ninth best showing in the country .1 9 
On a national scale, the success of Democratic candidates was mixed. 
President Richard M. Nixon won a landslide of historical proportions, getting 
521 electoral votes from forty-nine states. At the same time, however, Nixon 
appeared to have short coattails as the GOP only gained twelve seats in the 
House and had a net loss of two seats in the Senate.20 According to 
Congressional Quarterly, Clark would be part of a slightly more liberal Senate 
as six of the thirteen new Senators were tagged as either liberal or moderate 
which was an increase, considering that nine of the thirteen they were 
replacing were regarded as conservative. 21 
The information given about the reasons for Clark's victory can only serve 
as speculation, both on the part of Clark and on the part of the Des Moines 
Register. Clark's attacks on Miller's record, his walking campaign style, and 
what was happening on the national scene cannot really be translated into 
concrete, quantifiable explanations for his success. One way to produce such 
quantifiable explanations for Clark's electoral success is through comparing 
and contrasting a particular race or with other contests in the same 
geographical area. Another method of obtaining quantifiable results is by 
examining the geography of the election and then attempting to link various 
demographic characteristics with the vote in certain areas of the state. Both 
methods will be used in this paper. The information needed for such analysis 
will be included within the text (in the case of charts) or at the end of the 
paper (in the case of maps). Map 1 at the end of this paper shows all of the 
191bid. 
20Robert A. Diamond, ed., The Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American 
Government. Spring 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1973), 1-15. 
21 Ibid., 5. 
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counties in the state and their names. This map will serve as a reference for 
the reader. 
Map 2 shows the percentage of the Democratic vote in Iowa counties in 
the Clark-Miller race. 22 From this map, a few general statements can be 
made regarding the geographical distribution of the vote. First, Clark did well 
in the large majority of counties, winning seventy-three of the ninety-nine. 
Clark's victory was also relatively widespread, but he did particularly well in 
the Second District counties of Linn, Jackson, and Dubuque where he had been 
working full-time building Culver's constituent-service network. Clark also 
scored over 60% in Benton and Johnson counties (both bordering on the Second 
District) as well as in Des Moines, Wapello, Story, and Carroll counties. The 
few pockets of anti-Clark counties or pro-Miller counties were located in 
extreme northwest and southwest Iowa. In addition, four counties in the Third 
District (Butler, Bremer, Franklin, and Grundy counties) also voted heavily for 
Miller. 
Map 3 shows the relative change in the percentage of the Democratic vote 
from 1966 to 1972.23 One would expect Clark's percentages to show marked 
increases over those that the Democrat in 1966, E.B. Smith, received in his poor 
showing against Miller. From the map, one can see that Clark had, at the very 
least, a 20% increase in every county in the state. The largest increases came 
in the northwest corner of Iowa, a traditional Republican stronghold, and the 
eastern one-quarter of the state, the part of Iowa where Clark was best-
22 Ahern, 162-163. 
231bid. Also Lamberto, 411-412. The term "relative change" throughout this paper, as 
compared to the term "absolute change," means that, for example, if Clark received 20% of the two-
party vote in 1972 and 40% of the two-party vote in 1978, his relative percentage increase would be 
100%, because he doubled his earlier showing. Clark's absolute percentage increase, however, would 
only be 20%, i.e., Clark only gained twenty points in absolute terms from 1972-1978. 
8 
known. 
When compared to the other statewide races, Clark's win was impressive 
indeed. The statewide Democratic ticket only received about 44% of the 
vote. 24 Clark thus did almost twelve points better than the other Democrats 
running statewide. The question is, however, did Clark do about twelve points 
better than his fellow Democrats everywhere? By examining the statewide 
results for a relatively obscure race, Auditor of State, one can attempt to 
answer the above question. Map 4, the percentage of the Democratic vote for 
the 1972 Auditor's race, when compared with Map 2 shows that, in quite a few 
counties, Clark ran better than twelve points ahead of the Democratic 
candidate for Auditor.25 It should be noted that the Democratic candidate for 
Auditor ran behind the statewide Democratic ticket, 40.9% compared with 44%; 
as a result, Clark did about fifteen points better than the Democratic candidate 
for auditor. 
In only nine counties did both Clark and the Democratic candidate for 
Auditor of State receive similar enough percentages of the vote to put those 
counties in the same category in the legends on the two corresponding maps 
(Mills, Montgomery, Page, Butler, Sioux, Lyon, Shelby and Dallas). For example, 
Mills County was in the group of least Democratic counties for both contests. 
In the other ninety counties, Clark's percentage of the vote was usually much 
higher than the Auditor candidate's percentage. As a result, the counties in the 
over 60% Democratic and the 50.1-59.9% Democratic groupings in Map 2 are 
241n this paper, the term "statewide Democratic ticket" refers to all races in a given year in 
which the two major-party candidates for those offices ran in all ninety-nine counties, with the 
exception of the U.S. Senate contest. For example, in 1972, the statewide ticket consisted of the 
Democratic candidates for President, Governor, Secretary of State, Agriculture, Treasury, Attorney 
General, and Auditor of State. 
25Ahern, 168-169. 
9 
usually found in the 40-49.9% Democratic or the less than 40% Democratic 
groupings in Map 3. Clark scored about the same percentage ahead of the 
Auditor, and probably the other statewide candidates, in nearly every part of 
the state. 
The three demographic characteristics mentioned at the beginning of this 
paper will now be accounted for. When the data contained in Map 16 is 
combined with the average Democratic vote in each of the four categories 
listed on that map, one can compare Clark's vote in urban areas with that in 
rural areas.26 In the least urban counties, Clark received an average of 49.4% 
of the vote, or about six points under his statewide figure. The more urban the 
county, the larger percentage of the vote Clark received, with one small 
exception, as Table 1 below indicates. Interestingly, the category containing 
the most urban counties was the only category for this demographic 
characteristic in which Clark did better than he did in the state as a whole. 
Table 1. 
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According 
to the Degree of Urbanism in Iowa Counties, 1972 
% Urban % Dem. 1972 
0-23 (n=23) 49.4 
23-45.9 (n=44) 53.1 
46-68.9 (n=19) 50.3 
69-92.1 (n=13) 58.4 
Map 17 shows the percentage of Iowa counties' German-born populations 
in 1885.27 German-Americans are by far the largest ancestry group in the 
state, making them the obvious group to examine in an attempt to try to 
26u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 1980, part 
17, General Population Characteristics: Iowa (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1982), 17-17 to 17-18 and 17-232 to 17-240. 
27The State of Iowa, Census of Iowa for the Year 1885 (Des Moines, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 
1885), 164-166. 
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determine how much relationship, if any, existed between ancestry and voting 
behavior. Assuming that the influence of the German-born in Iowa in 1885 can 
be extended to the types of people that still live in those counties today, one 
can proceed with the same type of analysis that was used in the preceding 
paragraph. The counties that could be classified the least German in 1885 
were the weakest supporters of Clark's candidacy in 1972; likewise, the most 
German counties in 1885 were the most pro-Clark, as shown in the table below. 
Table 2. 
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According 
to the 1885 Foreign-Born German Population in Iowa Counties, 1972 
% German % Dem. 1972 
0-4 (n=47) 51.8 
5-9 (n=31) 52.1 
10-14 (n=14) 53.6 
15-or more (n=7) 56.1 
The upward progression in the percentages as the counties got more and more 
German was uninterrupted, i.e., there appears to be a direct relationship 
between Clark's percentages and the counties with heavy German ancestry, 
even though the relationship between German ancestry and voting behavior was 
weaker than that between urbanism and voting. 
The final demographic characteristic is religion. The subject of religion 
has been divided into three distinct categories representing the three largest 
denominations in the state: Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and United Methodist. 
As with urbanism and German ancestry, the larger the Catholic percentage of 
church members (see Map 18), the larger Clark's share of the vote in 1972, as 
indicated in Table 3 on the following page.28 The reason for the strong pro-
28National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Churches and Church Membership jn 
the United States. 1980: An Enumeration by Region. State. and County Based on Data Reported by 111 
11 
Clark vote in heavily Catholic counties probably stems from the fact that 
Catholics have long been part of the Iowa Democratic Party's base of support. 
Table 3. 
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According 
to the Percentage of Catholics in Iowa Counties, 1972 
% Catholic % Dem. 1972 
4-14 (n=30) 46.5 
15-29 (n=37) 53.8 
30-44 (n=24) 55.9 
45-81 (n=8) 57.7 
The relationship between the pro-Clark vote and the counties with large 
percentages of their respective populations belonging to a Lutheran church is 
less convincing than the other characteristics mentioned thus far, i.e., there is 
no clear, direct relationship between the 1972 Senate vote and Lutheran church 
membership. As Table 4 below indicates, Clark received a majority of the vote 
in each of the four categories shown on Map 19, but the percentages establish 
no clear pattern and, hence, no direct causal relationship.29 
Table 4. 
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According 
to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 1972 
% Lutheran % Dem. 1972 
0-14 (n=33) 53.2 
15-29 (n=37) 50.6 
30-44 (n=20) 54.5 
45-71 (n=9) 52.7 
The final demographic characteristic dealing with religion, the 
percentage of counties' populations classified as Methodist, is also the final 
demographic characteristic that is used in this study.30 Unlike any of the 
Church Bodies (Atlanta, Georgia: Glenmary Research Council, 1982), 102-111. 
291bid. 
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other demographic characteristics used for the 1972 election results, there 
appears to be an inverse relationship between counties with high percentages 
of Methodists and a strong pro-Clark vote. The two least Methodist categories 
of counties (see Map 20) had the highest pro-Clark average percentages, and the 
two most Methodist categories of counties had the lowest pro-Clark average 
percentages, as can be seen in the following table. 
Table 5. 
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According 
to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 1972 
% Methodist % Dem. 1972 
3-14 (n=20) 53.0 
15-26 (n=47) 53.7 
27-38 (n=23) 51.3 
39-56 (n=9) 47.2 
Finally, the average percentages in the most Methodist counties corresponds 
highly with the figures that Clark received from the least Catholic counties. 
Often, the more Catholic a county is, the less Methodist it is as well which 
also accounts for this inverse relationship between high percentages of 
Methodists and low Clark percentages. 
The widespread nature of Clark's surprise victory in 1972 (refer again to 
Map 2) over an incumbent senator made his subsequent defeat in 1978 to 
former Lt. Gov. Roger Jepsen difficult to understand. This was especially true 
considering the high approval ratings that Clark had received, as evidenced in 
the following bar graph.31 
301bid. 
31 The percentages contained in the two graphs are taken from the year-end publications of 
Iowa Polls by the Des Moines Register. Rather than listing all of the sources used to make this graph 
and the graph of Culver's approval ratings, found later in the paper, the reader should simply refer to 
the section in the Bibliography containing the entries for the Iowa Polls used in this study. 
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The graph shows that, with the exception of the first two Iowa Polls 
taken in 1973, 60% or more of the Iowans polled supported Clark from late 
1973 through the end of 1976. Clark peaked near 70% in January of 1977. 
Apparently, the heat of the campaign caused some slippage in Clark's numbers 
in 1978 as he temporarily dipped down to 52% approval while his disapproval 
rating shot up to 20%. Clark reversed the short-term downward slide by 
September 1978 when the Iowa Poll reported that he stood at 60% approval.32 
The fact that Clark's negatives remained as high as they had been in March of 
1978 is significant, even though he recovered from the hemorrhaging that he 
apparently suffered in his approval ratings in the early and middle part of 
1978. This is significant because it shows that Jepsen, his opponent, was 
32Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1977-1978 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines 
Register, 1978), 902. 
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having some success keeping Clark's negatives higher than they had normally 
been throughout his term in office. What kind of effort was Jepsen making to 
show Clark in an unfavorable light? 
Jepsen based his entire strategy on high turnout by a coalition of narrow-
focus groups, each of whose sole purpose in the 1978 Senate election was to 
defeat Dick Clark. 33 He was expected to raise at least $600,000 from groups 
that were pro-life, anti-gun control, anti-Panama Canal Treaty, pro-business, 
and anti-labor. 34 One of Jepsen's television ads even featured the main 
conservative politician in the United States: then former Governor Ronald 
Reagan of California.35 Clark, for his part, sought to strike much broader 
themes to try to deflect the negative criticism that he had received on such 
issues as U.S. involvement in Angola, his yes vote on the Panama Canal 
Treaties, his pro-choice position, and his opposition to tuition tax credits for 
parents who chose to send their children to private or parochial schools. He 
himself was expected to raise over $800,000 from various liberal special 
interest PAC's.36 
The Register reported that the 1978 race for the Senate appeared to 
center more on ideological differences between the two candidates and the 
effectiveness of single-issue voter groups than previous elections had. In one 
article written after the election, both candidates were accused by the 
Register of hurling the dirty words ·1ibera1· and ·conservative• too much 
without taking enough time to debate the issues that affected the majority of 
33Dennis Farney, "Clark-Jepsen Race: Clear-Cut Test of Single-Interest Groups' Power,• 
(Editorial) Des Moines Register, 1 November 1978, 14 (A). 
341bid. 
351bid. 
361bid. 
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lowans.37 The candidates, according to the Register had made the focus of the 
campaign too broad. In another article, the Register claimed that voters were 
focusing too much on these single issues without taking enough time to look at 
the broad picture of each candidate's record and beliefs and the effect that 
such beliefs might have on broad areas of policy.38 In other words, while the 
candidates' campaigns had become too broad, the voters had become too 
narrow-minded. 
Even with all the talk of single-issue voters and the liberal and 
conservative labels, Clark appeared to have held the lead throughout the 
campaign. As can be seen in the following graph, a slight narrowing had taken 
place between the incumbent and the challenger as election day neared, albeit a 
smaller narrowing than had occurred in the 1972 Clark-Miller contest. The 
Iowa Poll, after factoring in undecided voters, predicted that Clark would hold 
on and win by a margin of 54-45%.39 
When the final votes were counted, Jepsen had upset Clark by getting 
51.6% compared to Clark's 48.4% Immediately following the election, the 
Register credited Jepsen's victory to the fact that the GOP had done a better 
job of getting its partisans to vote. Turnout appeared to be higher than normal 
in the rural counties and lower than normal in the big-city counties, another 
factor the Register gave for the Jepsen win.40 One factor that the Register 
37 James Flansburg, "New 'Dirty Names' From Iowa's 1978 U.S. Senate Race,• (Editorial) 
Des Moines Register, 9 November 1978, 17 (A). 
38Farney. 
39Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1977-1978, 911. 
40The Regjster based this claim on the fact that the turnout in the seven most urban counties 
(Black Hawk, Dubuque, Linn, Polk, Pottawattamie, Scott, and Woodbury) was 20,000 votes less in 
1978 than in 1974, the preceding off-year election. According to my calculations, the decrease in the 
seven most urban counties was a little over 16,000 votes, which turned out to be a 5.5% decrease in 
the turnout in these counties. In addition, the Register stated that the rural turnout was heavier in 
1978 than in 1974. According to my calculations, however, the turnout in the twenty-three most 
rural counties actually decreased 11.4% from 1974 to 1978, a larger decrease than was found in the 
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denied having a pivotal outcome on the race was the abortion issue, reporting 
that their study indicated that abortion ·added no more than 25,000 votes to 
Jepsen's total.• If this is the case, though, abortion had a significant impact on 
the race as Jepsen only beat Clark by about 26,000 votes. Logically, if even 
half of the 25,000 voters who voted for Jepsen because of abortion would have 
otherwise voted for Clark, Clark may well have won the election. 
Clark, for his part, blamed his loss on the fact that 1978 was a more 
negative year than most, both in terms of the mood of the electorate and in 
terms of media coverage. He also credited the GOP with having better turnout 
than the Democrats. Perhaps most importantly, Clark blamed the persistence 
of single-issue interest groups, especially anti-abortion groups, in painting 
seven most urban counties. The Register may have confused the larger Republican margin of victory 
in many of these rural counties for an increased turnout. For example, in Adair County, Stanley beat 
Culver by about 200 votes in 1974, but Jepsen beat Clark by about 300 votes in 1978. This 
occurred even as the turnout in Adair County from 1974 to 1978 decreased 6.8%. 
17 
him as out-of-touch with the views of most lowans.41 
In the rest of the state, Democrats fared about as poorly as Clark. Iowa's 
House delegation, on which Democrats had outnumbered Republican four to two, 
now stood at three Democrats and three Republicans. This was due to Tom 
Tauke's defeat of Michael Blouin in the Second Congressional District. 
Republicans also gained control of both houses of the Iowa General Assembly, 
compiling post-election margins of 28-22 in the Senate and 56-44 in the 
House. About the only thing that Iowa Democrats could be happy about was the 
election of a Democrat to the Executive Council as Tom Miller ousted Richard 
Turner for the post of Attorney General. 4 2 
On the national scene, Republicans gained ground on the Democrats in both 
houses of Congress as well as winning more gubernatorial races than they had 
expected. Overall, the GOP gained three seats in the Senate, and more 
importantly for them, added more conservatives to their ranks than they had 
had before with the addition of Roger Jepsen (IA), William Armstrong (CO), and 
Gordon Humphrey (NH). The Republicans made modest gains in the U.S. House 
and gubernatorial races, picking up twelve and six seats, respectively.43 
What kinds of geographical distributions in the Iowa vote did this study 
find for 1978? By looking at Map 5, one can see that Clark only won twenty-
three of the counties compared to the seventy-three that he won six years 
earlier.44 He only had one area in which he did consistently well: the central 
41 Marjorie Randon Hershey, Running for Office: The Political Education of Campaigners 
(Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1984), 190. 
42The State of Iowa, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978 (Des Moines, 
Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1978), n.p. 
43Patricia Ann O'Connor, ed., The Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American 
Government, Spring 1979 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1979), 89-105. 
44The State of Iowa, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978. 
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portion of the state centering around Polk and Dallas counties. Clark also did 
exceptionally well in Johnson County. Jepsen did best in the northwest and 
southwest sections, two historically Republican areas, as well as parts of 
northeast Iowa. By looking at the two maps, one notices that many of the 
counties that had given Clark between 50.1% and 59.9% in 1974 only gave him 
between 40% and 49.9% in 1978. 
Map 6 shows the relative change in the Democratic share of the vote from 
1972 to 1978. 45 Notice that Clark actually had a percentage increase in five 
of the counties on the map; however, he still lost four of those five, winning 
only Audubon County. Notice also that Clark had relatively large percentage 
decreases in much of east central, northeast, and west central Iowa, and his 
largest percentage decreases came in Allamakee, Floyd, Grundy, and Woodbury 
counties, two of which he won in 1972. If one compares Map 6 with Map 3, one 
can see that Clark had heavy losses in 1978 in places where he had had sizable 
increases in 1972 over Smith's 1966 totals. These areas included parts of 
west central, east central, and northeast Iowa. In ways, then, the 1978 
election may have been a return to normalcy, at least in terms of the way that 
the Democratic candidate preformed in 1966. Map 7 also shows that Clark lost 
much of his support in the eastern one-quarter of the state as well as in a 
section of west central lowa.4 6 
Finally, Map 8, containing the geographical distribution of the vote in the 
1978 Auditor's election, has been inserted to compare Clark's showing with 
another statewide race.47 Remember, in 1972 Clark ran about twelve points 
45Ahern, 162-163. Also The State of Iowa, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 
7. 1978. 
461bid. 
47The State of Iowa, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978. 
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ahead of the Democratic ticket as a whole and about fifteen points ahead of the 
Democratic candidate for Auditor. In 1978, the Democratic ticket as a whole 
received 44.4% of the vote; thus, Clark still ran ahead of the ticket as a whole 
but only by about four points. He also ran closer to the Democratic candidate 
for Auditor ( only a six point difference between the two) than he did in the 
previous election. Interestingly, when comparing both maps for Auditor (4 and 
8), one can conclude that the vote in the Auditor's race was much more stable 
from one election to the next than the vote in the senate contest. 
The demographic characteristics examined for the 1972 election have 
also been examined for the 1978 election. For example, the urban/rural 
demographic characteristic shows the same pattern in 1978 as it did in 1972, 
i.e., Clark did better in the most urban counties and did poorest in the least 
urban counties in Map 16. Starting with the least urban counties and continuing 
to the most urban counties, Clark received 43.2%, 44.9%, 44.7% and 51.1 %. 
Table 6. 
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote 
According to the Degree of Urbanism in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978 
% Urban % Dem. 1972 % Dem. 1978 Absolute Change Relative Change 
0-23 (n=23) 49.4 43.2 -6.2 -13 
23-45.9 (n=44) 53.1 44.9 -8.2 -15 
46-68.9 (n=19) 50.3 44.7 -5.6 -11 
69-92.1 (n=13) 58.4 51.1 -7.3 -12 
Although each of these numbers is significantly lower than those Clark 
received in each category of counties in 1972, one can only tell how much 
lower by examining the percentage decrease according to the degree of 
urbanism in each of the four categories of counties listed in the legend in Map 
20 
16. As the table above shows, the urban/rural cleavage cannot really be 
considered a factor in Clark's defeat as his percentage of the vote declined 
about the same amount in each of the four categories of counties. 
The information on the most and least German counties tells a much 
different story than did the information on urban/rural differences within the 
state. In 1972, for example, the most German counties backed Clark's 
candidacy stronger than any of the other three categories of counties on Map 
17, giving him about 56% of the vote. In a dramatic turnaround, the least 
German counties became Clark's biggest supporters in 1978. Unlike 1972, 
Clark's share of the vote differed little between the most and the least German 
counties. Perhaps more significant is the fact that the most German counties 
accounted for the largest percentage decreases of the four categories found on 
Map 17, as shown in the table below. 
Table 7. 
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According to the 
1885 Foreign-Born German Population in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978 
% German % Dem. 1972 % Dem. 1978 Absolute Change Relative Change 
0-4 (n=47) 51.8 47.2 -4.6 -9 
5-9 (n=31) 52.1 43.7 -8.4 -16 
10-14 (n=14) 53.6 42.7 -10.9 -20 
15-or more (n= 7)56.1 44.5 -11.6 -21 
Some have speculated that religion's impact on the 1978 vote was closely 
linked to the issue of abortion.48 The Register said that, at the very most, the 
abortion factor accounted for 25,000 votes for Jepsen but that that amount 
was not enough to change the course of the election. Peter Hart, a Democratic 
48Hershey, 190. 
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pollster, found in a post-election survey that roughly 4% (about 26,000 voters) 
of those voting changed their preference because of the abortion question.49 
Theoretically, a strong anti-Clark vote from large numbers of pro-life voters 
could have made the difference, or at least contributed in a significant way to 
a loose coalition of anti-Clark special interest groups. Interestingly, in an 
Iowa Poll printed on November 5, 1978, the Register reported that 4% of the 
electorate said that abortion was the most important issue regarding how they 
would vote in the Clark-Jepsen race.so 
Because abortion is so often linked with religion, if abortion really had 
an impact on the outcome of the race, one should be able to see significant 
losses for Clark in those counties in which the dominant religion opposed 
abortion. The Roman Catholic Church, strong in parts of Iowa as well as Iowa's 
largest denomination, has always taken a strong pro-life view. If the views of 
Catholics at large are consistent with the views of the church hierarchy, then 
one should see a slide in Clark's support in the most Catholic counties. 
However, finding evidence that the views of the laity and the church hierarchy 
coincide is difficult, as most Gallup polls taken on the subject show little 
difference between Catholics' and Protestants' views on abortion.5 1 
Any evidence that suggests that Catholic church members were more 
opposed to abortion than Protestant church members and thus in accord with 
the church hierarchy would help to establish that religion influenced the pro-
life/anti-Clark vote. The Register, in 1978, produced two such pieces of 
evidence. First, an Iowa Poll printed on October 22 reported that the state's 
491bid. 
50 oes Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1977-1978, 911 . 
51 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion. 1978 (Wilmington, Delaware: 
Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1979), 32-33. 
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Catholics, by a 2-1 margin, favored either banning abortions altogether on 
permitting them only to save the life of the mother whereas Protestants, by a 
3-2 margin, favored allowing abortion under broader circumstances.52 Thus, 
the Catholic/Protestant cleavage on the issue of abortion that the Gallup Poll 
failed to find working at the national level apparently had the potential to 
work at the Iowa level. In addition, 12% of the state's voting Catholics, 
compared with only 4% of all Iowans, ranked abortion as the most important 
issue in the 1978 senate race. 5 3 
If there really was a link between abortion, religion, and the Clark loss, 
the numbers should show significant losses for Clark in the heavily Catholic 
areas of the state as well as smaller losses in the more Protestant areas of 
the state. Remember, in 1972, the most Catholic counties had been Clark's 
biggest supporters, giving him almost 58% of the vote. In 1978, the most 
Catholic counties supported Clark at about the same level as the other three 
categories of counties found in Map 18. Going from the least Catholic counties 
to the most Catholic counties, Clark received 41.5%, 46.9%, 46.9%, and 46.8% of 
the vote. More important, perhaps, is the percentage drop for each of the four 
categories as shown in the table below. 
Table 8. 
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote 
According to the Percentage of Catholics in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978 
% Catholic % Dem. 1972 % Dem. 1978 Absolute Change Relative Change 
4-14 (n=30) 46.5 41.5 -5.0 
15-29 (n=37) 53.8 46.9 -6.9 
30-44 (n=24) 55.9 46.9 -9.0 
45-81 (n=8) 57.7 46.8 -10.9 
52Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1977-1978, 909. 
531bid., 911. 
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As the table shows, Clark suffered his heaviest losses in the most Catholic 
counties. Apparently, the abortion issue moved enough Catholics to vote 
against Clark to contribute to the Jepsen victory. 
Linking the Lutheran vote to the abortion issue is much more difficult to 
do since no Iowa poll breaks down the Protestant denominations into separate 
categories such as Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and so on. The official 
statements of the American Lutheran Church and the Lutheran Church in 
America, by far the two largest Lutheran bodies in the United States at the 
time, each published somewhat middle-of-the-road statements on abortion, 
affirming the right of women to make the choice to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy yet, at the same, time urging all those who are considering such a 
profound move to consider the impact of the decision.54 Because the Lutheran 
bodies took such middle-of-the-road positions, it would be hard to link the 
decrease, if any, in the Clark vote in the most Lutheran counties, the next most 
Lutheran counties, and so on with the subject of abortion. In addition, the 
second largest Lutheran body in Iowa at the time was the Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod, a far more conservative church on social issues. Because the 
author grouped all Lutherans together rather than separating the conservative 
Lutherans from the moderate Lutherans, any clear link between the vote in 
heavily Lutheran counties and the pro or anti-Clark vote would be hard to 
establish. 
As Table 9 indicates, going from least Lutheran counties to the most 
Lutheran counties, Clark received averages in 1978 of 48.1 %, 42.7%, 45.9%, and 
54The American Lutheran Church, Office of Church in Society, Abortion: A Series of 
Statements of The American Lutheran Church. 1974. 1976, and 1980 (Minneapolis, Minnesota: 
Augsburg Publishing House, 1980), 9-12. Also Lutheran Church in America, Division for Mission 
in North America, Social Statements of the American Lutheran Church: Sex. Marriage. and Family 
(New York, New York: Lutheran Church in America, 1970), 4-5. 
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44%. In addition, no clear correlation existed between either the most or least 
Lutheran counties and the percentage drop from 1972 to 1978. 
Table 9. 
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote 
According to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978 
% Lutheran % Dem. 1972 % Dem. 1978 Absolute Change Relative Change 
0-14 (n=33) 53.2 48.1 -5.1 -10 
15-29 (n=37) 50.6 42.7 -7.9 -16 
30-44 (n=20) 54.5 45.9 -8.6 -16 
45-71 (n=9) 52.7 44.0 -8.7 -16 
Linking the Methodist counties to the abortion issue is easier in the sense 
that the Iowa Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church issued very 
liberal stands on the subject of abortion.55 In addition, the Annual Conference 
that met in 1979 commended Dick Clark, himself a United Methodist, for the 
work that he had done in the Senate to promote world peace.56 Because the 
Iowa Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church is composed of church 
hierarchy, local pastors, .and. local laity, it should not be surprising that, 
although Clark was supported the least in the most Methodist counties in 1972, 
those same counties supported him in 1978 at about the same rate as the other 
three categories of counties found in Map 20. In fact, the most Methodist 
counties in 1978 provided Clark with the smallest percentage drop of any of 
the categories of counties in any of the other demographic characteristics used 
in this study. 
55Charles D. Gilbert, Journal and Official Records: 1974 Iowa Annual Conference of the 
United Methodist Church Vol. 2 (Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Annual Conference of the United Methodist 
Church, 1974), 396. 
56 Jill D. Stanton, Journal and Official Records: 1979 Iowa Annual Conference of the United 
Methodist Church Vol. 2 (Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 
1979), 363. 
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Table 10. 
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote 
According to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978 
% Methodist % Dem. 1972 % Dem. 1978 Absolute Change Relative Change 
3-14 (n=20) 53.0 43.3 -9.7 -18 
15-26 (n=47) 53.7 46.3 -7.4 -14 
27-38 (n=23) 51.3 45.1 -6.2 -12 
39-56 (n=9) 47.2 45.0 -2.2 -5 
While the methods that have been used in this study cannot prove the 
reasons for either Clark's surprise victory over Miller in 1972 or his surprise 
defeat by Jepsen in 1978, they can at least point to some groups of Iowans who 
appear to have given Clark the support that contributed to his 1972 victory 
(urban Iowans, Iowans of German ancestry, and Catholics) as well as groups 
that helped contribute to his 1978 defeat (rural Iowans, Iowans of German 
ancestry, and Catholics). Even though the results of the study are not 
conclusive, they have been arrived at through more scientific means than the 
mere speculation given by the candidates themselves or by the major media. 
The Culver election of 197 4 and his subsequent defeat in 1980 will be dealt 
with in the same manner. In addition, some comparisons between the elections 
and defeats of both men will be made. 
John Culver and the Elections of 1974 and 1980 
On the surface, the Culver election of 197 4 and defeat of 1980 would 
appear to be similar to the Clark races in 1972 and 1978. After all, both 
Culver and Clark grew up in Eastern Iowa's Second Congressional District and 
relied on on that district's urban triangle--Cedar Rapids, Clinton, and Dubuque-
-for much of their traditional Democratic base. Both also were considered 
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liberal and won their elections to the Senate in the early 1970s. Most of all, 
both failed to win second terms and were beaten by conservative Republicans. 
After exploring these similarities, however, one must stretch to find many 
examples of parallels between the two men and their candidacies. Indeed, their 
backgrounds and the circumstances surrounding their elections and defeats 
were quite different. 
Whereas Clark had grown up poor in rural towns during the Great 
Depression, Culver came from a Cedar Rapids family that was prominent and 
relatively well off, if not wealthy by Iowa standards.57 Clark could only 
afford to attend a small liberal arts college close to home, Upper Iowa; Culver 
chose to continue a family tradition by attending Harvard University in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, as both his father and grandfather had done.58 
While at Harvard Culver participated in varsity football, playing well enough to 
be drafted by the Chicago Cardinals. s9 Even the sport of choice of the two 
men differed as Clark was a hometown baseball great! 
Politically, Culver shared the Republican outlook of his parents 
throughout most of his college career. It was not until his graduate studies in 
Cambridge, England, his service in the U.S. Marine Corps, and his subsequent 
studies at Harvard Law School that he evolved into a liberal Democrat. Much of 
the reason for this evolution can be attributed to the fact that his law school 
years allowed Culver to become involved heavily in the 1962 senatorial 
campaign of Ted Kennedy, Culver's close friend and former roommate at 
Harvard. 60 After serving a brief stint as Kennedy's legislative assistant, 
57Larew, 139. 
581bid. 
591bid. 
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Culver returned to Cedar Rapids in 1964 to successfully run for the Second 
District House seat. Culver's personal campaign style and close association 
with the Kennedy family helped him win reelection in 1966, 1968, 1970, and 
1972. 
The 1972 campaign is considered by many today to be a missed 
opportunity on Culver's part. Most Iowa Democrats had hoped that Culver would 
challenge Jack Miller for the senate seat, but Culver decided that Miller was 
too popular to beat. Because of Dick Clark's surprising upset of Miller, Culver 
had to bank his chances of winning a senate seat on the 197 4 retirement of 
Harold Hughes. From the outset, even the victories of Clark and Culver were 
different as Clark had to overcome an incumbent whereas Culver competed for 
an open seat that his party had controlled previously. Culver also had the 
advantage of being a Democrat in what had the potential to be a big Democratic 
year, for the 1974 election came shortly after Watergate and President Nixon's 
humiliating downfall. Clark, two years earlier, had to run as a Democrat in the 
Nixon landslide. 
Culver used Watergate as well as issues relating to the economy, 
defense, taxes, health care, and his ten-year cumulative voting record in the 
House against his opponent David Stanley, a veteran of the Iowa General 
Assembly and the unsuccessful GOP senatorial candidate against Hughes in 
1968. 61 According to Iowa Polls taken throughout the spring and summer, the 
candidates were locked in a relatively close race, as can be seen in the graph 
on the following page. 
60lbid., 140-141. 
61 Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll, 1973-1974, 652. 
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Even after Culver had taken the lead in the September poll, Stanley narrowed 
the race in October but not enough to overcome Culver's early fall surge. When 
all the votes were cast, Culver beat Stanley with 52.4% of the statewide two-
party vote, essentially by the same margin that the Register had predicted.62 
Nationally, the 197 4 election lived up to its billing as a heavily 
Democratic year. In the Senate, the Democrats picked up three seats, extending 
their majority over the Republicans to 61-39. Many senators elected in 1974 
are still serving in that office today, including Dale Bumpers (AR), Wendell 
Ford (KY), John Glenn (OH), and Patrick Leahy (VT). In the House, the Democrats 
gained a whopping forty-three seats for a 291-144 majority.63 The Class of 
'74, which was among the youngest since the end of World War II, also had the 
62 Peglow, 160-161. 
63Mary Cohn, ed., The Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American Government, 
Spring 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1975), 1-6. 
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largest number of freshmen congressmen since the Congress elected in 
1948. 64 Overall, this gain of Democrats in the House and Senate, combined 
with the reelection victories of liberal Senate Republicans such as Bob 
Packwood (OR) and Jacob Javits (NY), contributed to a leftward shift in both 
houses. Democrats also won a net total of five gubernatorial races in 197 4, 
extending their majority in this category to 36-14, the largest differential 
between the two parties since 1937.65 
In looking at the geographical distribution of the 1974 vote (see Map 9), 
one can see both similarities and differences between this election and the 
Clark triumph of 1972. 66 Note first that Culver only won forty-seven 
counties statewide compared with the seventy-three counties that Clark won 
in 1972. 
Luckily for Culver, three of the five counties that he won by very large 
margins (those counties giving him over 60% of the vote) were the highly urban 
counties of Linn, Johnson, and Dubuque. These were also counties in, or 
bordering on, Culver's own Second District. In fact, the northeast and east 
central part of the state, i.e., the Second District, is one of the few sections 
that Culver did well in as a whole. Culver's best showing overall came in the 
central section of the state in counties such as Polk, Dallas, Warren, Story, 
Boone, Jasper, Marion, and Madison. Culver also did well in a string of counties 
bordering the Missouri River, a few counties in the southern two tiers, and five 
counties in the north central part of the state. Other than in those five places, 
however, Culver won only a scattered county here or there. 
Map 10 shows the relative percentage change for the senate seat that 
641bid., 7. 
651bid., 13. 
66 Peglow, 160-161. Also Ahern, 162-163. 
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Culver won in 197 4 compared to how Hughes did in his race for the same seat 
in 1968.67 The fact that Culver scored a percentage increase in seventy 
counties over the Hughes percentages in 1968 shows that, even though Culver 
ran in a very close election, the Hughes victory was much closer. Indeed, 
Hughes beat Stanley by only a 50.4-49.6% margin. 
When compared to the other Democrats running for statewide office, 
Culver's 1974 victory was not as impressive as Clark's in 1972. Clark won 
almost 56% of the vote compared to 44% for all the other candidates running in 
statewide races. Culver only ran about six percentage points ahead of the 
statewide Democratic ticket in 197 4, a better than usual Democratic year in 
the nation as a whole. When comparing Culver's 197 4 geographic distribution 
of the vote against the geographic distribution of the vote for the 1974 
Democratic candidate for Auditor (see Map 11 ), one can see that in only five 
counties did both Culver and the Auditor candidate score between 50 and 59.9%, 
Monroe, Dallas, Monona, Wapello, and Des Moines.68 In no counties did the 
candidate for Auditor garner 60% or more of the Democratic vote. In fact, 
Culver ran about seven points ahead of the Auditor candidate, about the same 
percentage ahead he ran against the Democratic ticket as a whole. 
The three demographic characteristics used in analyzing the Clark/Miller 
and Clark/Jepsen races (urban/rural, German ancestry, and religion) will also 
be used to analyze the Culver elections in 197 4 and 1980. For example, when 
the data in Map 16 is combined with the average percentage of the Democratic 
vote in the 1974 election, one can compare how well Culver did according to 
67L. Dale Ahern, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1969-1970 (Des Moines, Iowa: The State of 
Iowa, 1969), 351-352. Also Peglow, 160-161. 
68peglow, 166-167. 
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the degree of urbanism in Iowa's counties, as indicated in the table below. 
Table 11. 
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According 
to the Degree of Urbanism in Iowa Counties, 1974 
% Urban % Dem. 1974 
0-23 (n=23) 45.4 
23-45.9 (n=44) 49.8 
46-68.9 (n=19) 46.5 
69-92.1 (n=13) 55.8 
As happened with Clark in 1972, the more urban the county (with one 
exception), the higher the average percentage Democratic. Not surprisingly, the 
most urban counties, those which were 69-92.1 % urban, gave Clark his highest 
average percentages, coming in at 55.8%. The category of counties which was 
classified as most urban was the only category of counties which gave Culver a 
higher average percentage of the vote than he received statewide. 
No clear relationship between how German a county was (refer again to 
Map 17) and the size of its Culver vote existed. The range of the average 
percentages for Culver between the least German counties and the most German 
counties was only four percentage points compared with the ten point range 
found in Table 11. Nevertheless, Culver did appear to do better in the most 
German counties. 
Table 12. 
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According 
to the 1885 Foreign-Born German Population in Iowa Counties, 197 4 
% Urban % Dem. 1974 
0-4 ( n=4 7) 49 .4 
5-9 (n=31) 53.1 
10-14 (n=14) 50.3 
15-or more (n=7) 58.4 
32 
The range was neither as large as Clark's 1972 range of average percentages of 
the vote nor was the relationship between German ancestry and the Democratic 
vote as clear. Numbers such as these make it difficult to say that the more 
German a county was the more likely it was to support Culver heavily or vice 
versa. 
Of the three religious denominations used in this study, the percentage of 
a county's population classified as either Catholic or Methodist appear to show 
the greatest correlation between a pro or anti-Culver vote in 197 4. According 
to the table below, the range of the Culver percentage between the group of 
least Catholic counties and the most Catholic counties (see Map 18) was about 
thirteen points, far larger than the range for either urbanism characteristic or 
German ancestry. This was also a larger range than Clark had for the same 
counties in 1972. In short, the more Catholic a county was, the more 
Democratic it voted in the 1974 U.S. Senate contest. 
Table 13. 
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According 
to the Percentage of Catholics in Iowa Counties, 197 4 
% Catholic % Dem. 197 4 
4-14 (n=30) 43.8 
15-29 (n=37) 49.4 
30-44 (n=24) 51.4 
45-81 (n=8) 57.1 
The more Methodist a county was (see Map 20), the less likely its 
residents would support Culver in 197 4. This is the same type of inverse 
relationship seen with this characteristic that was displayed in the 1972 Clark 
victory. The range from the most to least Methodist counties was about seven 
percentage points, larger than the range for the German/non-German 
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characteristic but smaller than for the urban/rural or the Catholic demographic 
characteristics. 
Table 14. 
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According 
to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 197 4 
% Methodist % Dem. 1974 
3-14 (n=20) 50.9 
15-26 (n=47) 49.8 
27-38 (n=23) 47.4 
39-56 (n=9) 44.1 
Again, like the 1972 Clark election, the average percentages for the least 
to the most Lutheran counties and their relationship to the Culver vote is less 
clear, as seen in Table 15 below. Whereas Clark received average majorities in 
each of the four categories of counties in Map 19, Culver only received a 
majority in one, that category of counties with 30-44% of their respective 
populations classified as Lutheran. 
Table 15. 
The Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote According 
to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 1974 
% Lutheran % Dem. 1974 
0-14 (n=33) 49.4 
15-29 (n=37) 47.7 
30-44 (n=20) 50.6 
45-71 (n=9) 48.0 
Culver's narrow victory in 197 4 meant that he might be vulnerable in his 
1980 reelection bid. Indeed, national parties often target senators for defeat 
who won their initial elections to the Senate by a very slim margin. There 
have, however, been senators who have won narrowly in their initial contests 
and then won by increasing margins in following elections. If this had been all 
that Culver had to worry about, there would not have been the anxiety that 
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existed in his campaign in 1980.69 Some of the other factors that worried 
Culver were the loss of Dick Clark (Culver's ideological twin) to a conservative 
Republican two years earlier, the apparent success of the anti-abortion/pro-
family coalition in 1978 and their pledge to target Culver in 1980, the growing 
unpopularity of the national Democratic party as a result of the poor economy 
and the weak leadership of President Jimmy Carter, and the prospect of running 
against popular Third District Congressman Charles Grassley, who had run 
unopposed in 1978 and thus had a sizable war chest of funds at his disposal.70 
The most ominous forewarning of defeat for Culver was the unfavorable trend 
in his approval ratings as measured by Iowa Polls taken since he had assumed 
office . 
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69Hershey, 222-223. 
701bid. Also James Flansburg, "Iowa Voters Surge to Join Reagan, Big Rural-Area Vote Helps 
Grassley Victory," Des Moines Register, 4 (A). 
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Note in the graph on the previous page that, only once during his six-year 
term (January of 1977), did Culver receive above 50% approval. In every other 
Iowa Poll in which Iowans were asked if they approved, disapproved, or had no 
opinion of the job that John Culver was doing as U.S. Senator, Iowans always 
responded with less than 50% approval. Probably more important are Culver's 
final three approval ratings. In March and July of 1978 and in January of 1979, 
Culver only managed to win the approval of 39%, 36%, and 38%, respectively.71 
In addition, instead of having high disapproval ratings, Culver had very large 
percentages of Iowans who had no opinion, either good or bad, of him. The fact 
that between 40 and 50% of the state's population had no opinion of him for his 
entire six-year term was a sign that Culver's reelection chances were in doubt. 
Because such large percentages had no opinion of Culver, Grassley could 
manufacture unfavorable opinions of Culver more easily during the campaign by 
molding public opinion in his favor. 
Grassley, from the beginning, sought to paint Culver as out-of-touch with 
the concerns and feelings of normal, everyday lowans.72 Grassley pointed out 
that Culver had actually lived in the state for only a very short period of time 
between his high school days and 1980. He noted that Culver spent little time 
in the state, especially when compared to Grassley's work as a farmer, teacher, 
and factory worker in the state.73 In fact, Grassley's rural image was one of 
his major selling points. Grassley also accused Culver of being too liberal and 
too much a part of the Democratically-controlled Congress, which Grassley 
blamed for the nation's high inflation rate. For his part, Grassley campaigned 
71 Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll, 1977-1978, 878 and 902. Also Des Moines 
Register, The Iowa Poll, 1979 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines Register, 1979), 926. 
72Flansburg, "Iowa Voters Join Surge," 4 (A). 
73David Yepsen, "Grassley Roots Sunk Deep in Frugal Soil," Des Mojnes Regjster, 5 (A). 
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on the Reagan platform, calling for increased defense spending and lower 
taxes.74 These issues apparently worked in Grassley's favor, as he jumped out 
to a substantial lead in the Iowa Polls taken in the summer of 1980.75 
Culver met the Grassley attack head-on by forcefully defending his 
liberal principles.76 Apparently, Culver believed that Clark two years earlier 
had failed to appear passionately dedicated to liberalism and had wavered too 
much under the weight of Jepsen's attacks. Culver vowed not to make the same 
mistakes that Clark had made. He began by attacking Grassley for being too 
conservative as well as an ineffective member of the Iowa Congressional 
delegation. 77 In offering proof that Grassley was ineffective, Culver pointed 
out that Grassley voted in opposition to the rest of the state's Congressional 
delegation, Republicans included, on 612 House roll call votes in his six years 
in that body.78 Culver's forceful defense of himself and his ideology, coupled 
with his attacks on Grassley, helped him regain the lead in the Iowa Polls taken 
in the early fall. 7 9 
By election day, the Register predicted that the race would be close, and, 
after factoring in the undecided likely voters, the Register concluded that 
Grassley would prevail by the narrow margin of 51.6% to 48.4%.80 After all 
the votes were counted, Grassley prevailed by a larger margin than expected, 
winning 54% of the two-party vote.81 In the rest of the state, Republicans 
74Flansburg, "Iowa Voters Join Surge," 4 (A}. 
75Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1980 (Des Moines, Iowa: Des Moines Register, 
1980), 990. 
76Hershey, 223. 
77Flansburg, "Iowa Voters Join Surge," 4 (A}. 
781bid. 
79Des Moines Register, The Iowa Poll. 1980, 997, 998, and 1003. 
80 1bid., 1006. 
81 Mary Ellen Gautchier, ed., Iowa Official Register. 1981-1982 (Des Moines, Iowa: The 
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also did well, winning control of Iowa's Congressional delegation for the first 
time since 1972. The Republican candidate for President, Ronald Reagan, won 
Iowa with almost 58% of the two-party vote. The GOP also retained control of 
both houses of the Iowa General Assembly.82 
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Nationally, the Grassley win contributed to a Republican landslide. 
Reagan won the Presidency with a forty-four state romp, rolling up a 489-49 
margin in the electoral college. In addition, the GOP captured control of the 
Senate for the first time since since the 1947-48 session.83 More important 
than the increase in numbers that the Republicans had in the new senate was 
the decidedly more conservative ideologies of many of the GOP's new senators. 
State of Iowa, 1981), 146-147. 
82 1bid., 144-145 and 148-150. Also Charles Bullard and Bonnie Wittenburg, "GOP Mulls 
Leader Posts After Legislative Takeover," Des Moines Register, 1 (A). 
83Nancy Lammers, ed., The Congressional Quarterly Guide to Current American Government. 
Spring 1981 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1981), 7-11. 
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In addition to Grassley's Iowa victory, conservative candidates won in 
Washington, Idaho, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, 
North Carolina, and New Hampshire. The new faces in the Senate from those 
states included Slade Gorton, Steve Symms, James Abdnor, Bob Kasten, Dan 
Quayle, Jeremiah Denton, Mack Mattingly, Paula Hawkins, John East, and Warren 
Rudman. Some of the defeated liberal senators in addition to Culver included 
Frank Church (ID), Birch Bayh (IN), Warren Magnuson (WA), and George McGovern 
(SD).84 The GOP also gained seats in the U.S. House as well as picking up four 
governorships. 85 
In addition to the points that have been analyzed in the discussions of the 
1972, 1974, and 1978 elections, i.e., the geographical distribution of the vote, 
the senate race compared to the statewide Democratic ticket, and the taking 
into account of the three demographic characteristics (urban/rural, German 
ethnicity, and religion), one other point needs to be emphasized when analyzing 
the Culver loss of 1980. This other point is how well Culver fared in 
Grassley's Third District and how well Grassley did in Culver's former Second 
District. 
Map 12, the geographical distribution of the vote in the Culver/Grassley 
race, shows that Culver lost heavily in most areas of the state.86 The only 
area in which Culver consistently won was in the central Iowa counties of 
Polk, Boone, Story, Webster, Dallas, and Warren. Culver also did fairly well in 
Monroe, Wapello, Des Moines, Lee, Linn, Johnson, and Dubuque counties. Overall, 
Culver won only thirteen of the state's ninety-nine counties. Interestingly, 
84lbid. 
B51bid., 14-19 and 23-24. 
B6Gautchier, 146-147. 
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when Map 12 is compared to Map 5 (the geographical distribution of the vote in 
Clark's 1978 loss), one notices that the Culver loss was much more widespread 
than the Clark loss, as evidenced by the fact that, in 1980, Culver had forty-
eight counties that supported him with 20.7-39.9% of the vote while Clark had 
only seventeen counties in that category. On the whole, both Clark and Culver 
retained the counties in central Iowa the best. 
Map 13 shows the relative percentage change in the Democratic Senate 
vote from 1974 to 1980.87 Notice that Culver's percentages suffered the 
most in the western one-fourth of the state as well as in east central, 
northeast, and north central Iowa. Note also that east central, northeast, and 
north central Iowa is the area that contains the Second and Third Congressional 
Districts. Map 14, showing the absolute percentage gain or loss for Culver 
from 1974 to 1978, shows much the same phenomenon as Map 13, i.e., Culver 
lost much support in the areas contained in his and Grassley's Congressional 
Districts as well as in the western one-quarter of the state.BB In fact, the 
average percentage that Culver received in both can be seen in the following 
table. 
Table 16. 
Culver's Average Percentage of the Vote in the 
Second and Third Congressional Districts, 1974 and 1980 
District 
2nd 
3rd 
Statewide 
% Dem. 1974 
55.0 
48.3 
52.4 
% Dem. 1980 
43.3 
35.2 
46.0 
Absolute Change 
-9.1 
-13.1 
-6.4 
Relative Change 
-21.3 
-27.1 
-12.2 
As the table above suggests, Culver lost substantially in the Second and 
871bid. Also Peglow, 160-161. 
BBGautchier, 146-147. 
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the Third Congressional Districts, two areas that he probably needed to do well 
in if he were to have any chance of winning reelection. Interestingly, Culver 
lost a larger percentage, both absolute and relative, in the Second District than 
he lost in the state as a whole. Similarly, Culver's 13.1 % absolute point loss 
and his 27.1 % relative point loss in the Third District is directly related to 
Grassley's success as a Congressman there and his popularity in the area. 
It is hard to compare the 1980 Culver/Grassley race with the statewide 
Democratic ticket because in 1980 there was only one other statewide 
election: the 1980 Presidential contest between President Carter and Ronald 
Reagan. This was the only other statewide contest because, after 1974, the 
members of Iowa's Executive Council were elected every four years rather than 
every two years thus making non-Presidential election years those in which 
large numbers of candidates ran on a statewide basis. 
Map 15 shows the percentage Democratic in the 1980 Presidential 
election in Iowa. 89 Note that Carter and Culver had the same areas of 
strength centered in the east central and central sections of the state. Note as 
well that Carter won a majority in only four counties: Wapello, Des Moines, 
Johnson, and Dubuque. Statewide, Culver ran about three points ahead of 
Carter, and judging by the great similarity in Maps 12 and 15, he ran about that 
far ahead in most counties as well. 
How did Culver's 1980 defeat compare to his 197 4 victory in terms of the 
three demographic characteristics being studied? Did Culver suffer the most 
at the hands of the same groups that contributed to Clark's 1978 loss? The 
relationship between the least urban to most urban counties and the 1980 
Culver vote is outlined in the following table. Note that, in the most urban 
89 1bid., 144-145. 
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counties, Culver still garnered an average of 50% of the vote. Even though this 
constituted an absolute point loss of about six percentage points for Culver 
compared to his 197 4 average percentage, the voters in the most urban 
counties tended to desert Culver in far smaller proportions than did those in 
the less urban counties. 
Table 17. 
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic U.S. Senate Vote 
According to the Degree of Urbanism in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980 
% Urban % Dem. 1974 % Dem. 1980 Absolute Change Relative Change 
0-23 (n=23) 45.4 36.2 -9.2 -20 
23-45.9 (n=44) 49.8 40.2 -9.6 -19 
46-68.9 (n=19) 46.5 41.3 -5.2 -11 
69-92.1 (n=13) 55.8 50.0 -5.8 -10 
The Culver loss can definitely be linked to the urban/rural phenomenon. 
The more rural a county was, the greater the possibility that Culver's would 
lose heavily in that county. This direct relationship between rural ism and 
Culver's loss was much more apparent than in the case of Clark's 1978 loss 
(refer to Map 1 ). 
The information on German ancestry and the Culver vote in 1980 is 
similar to the same information found in the 1978 loss of Clark to Jepsen, i.e., 
the most German counties showed a drop off in support of Culver from 197 4 to 
1980 that was twice as large as the drop off of the least German counties. 
Instead of the most German counties being the most supportive of Culver as 
they were in 197 4, the least German counties became the strongest supporters 
of Culver in 1980, even though they supported Culver with an average of only 
42.6% (see the table below and refer also to Table 2). 
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Table 18. 
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According to the 
1885 Foreign-Born German Population in Iowa Counties, 1974-1980 
% German % Dem. 1974 % Dem. 1980 Absolute Change Relative Change 
0-4 (n=47) 48.4 42.6 -5.8 -12 
5-9 (n=31) 50.8 39.2 -11.6 -23 
10-14 (n=14) 48.6 38.8 -9.8 -20 
15-or more (n=7) 52.4 39.6 -12.8 -24 
When comparing the Culver numbers on this subject to the Clark numbers, one 
can see that the only difference between the two is that the relative 
percentage change from 197 4 to 1980 for the group of counties with 5-9% of 
their respective 1885 populations classified as German was larger than for the 
group of counties with 10-14% of their populations German. This put a break in 
the size of the percentage drops for the Culver numbers whereas the Clark 
numbers showed increasing relative percentage decreases of 9%, 16%, 20%, and 
21 % from the least German to the most German counties. 
In 1974 Catholic counties were Culver's strongest supporters, Methodist 
counties were his weakest supporters, and Lutheran counties were somewhere 
in between. Remember also that, in considering Clark's 1978 loss, the voters 
in Catholic counties deserted Clark in far larger numbers than did the voters in 
Methodist counties, a phenomenon that may have been linked to abortion. The 
notion that the Culver defeat was similar to the Clark defeat on the issue of 
religion is only partially true. For example, the more Catholic a county tended 
to be, the greater likelihood that Culver's average percentage would drop by a 
large amount. This happened in the Clark defeat as well. One big difference 
between the two elections needs to be mentioned, however. In the case of 
Culver, the least Catholic counties (4-14% Catholic) abandoned him at a very 
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high rate (-18%) and, in fact, deserted Culver at a higher rate than the counties 
that were 15-29% and 30-44% Catholic. This makes the relationship between 
highly Catholic counties and large anti-Culver voting in 1980 less clear than 
the same information for the anti-Clark vote in 1978. 
% Catholic 
4-14 (n=30) 
15-29 (n=37) 
30-44 (n=24) 
45-81 (n=8) 
Table 19. 
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According 
to the Percentage of Catholics in Iowa Counties, 197 4-1980 
% Dem. 1974 % Dem. 1980 Absolute Change Relative Change 
43.8 35.7 -9.2 -18 
49.4 42.5 -6.9 -14 
51.4 44.1 -7.3 -14 
57.1 41.5 -15.6 -27 
As with the Clark defeat of 1978, Culver lost much less support among 
heavily Methodist counties than he did in counties where Methodists were a 
small part of the church membership. It should be noted, though, that the most 
Methodist counties gave Culver such a low average percentage of the vote in 
197 4 that the relatively small percentage decrease in 1980 was because the 
starting point was so low. At any rate, the more Methodist a county was the 
more loyal it remained to Culver in 1980. 
% Methodist 
3-14 (n=20) 
15-26 (n=47) 
27-38 (n=23) 
39-56 (n=9) 
Table 20. 
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According 
to the Percentage of Methodists in Iowa Counties, 197 4-1980 
% Dem. 1974 % Dem. 1980 Absolute Change Relative Change 
50.9 38.4 -12.5 -25 
49.8 42.4 -7.4 -15 
47.4 40.4 -7.0 -15 
44.1 38.2 -5.9 -13 
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As to the question of whether or not the abortion issue played a role 
similar to that in the 1978 election is unclear because the Register took no 
poll in either 1979 or 1980 that dealt specifically with religion and the 
abortion issue. Aside from that, however, the Register reported that, in a poll 
taken as voters left the polling places, 10% of the Grassley voters voted for 
him because of his tough, pro-life position.90 If these voters would have 
voted for Culver otherwise, then the poll might be relevant, but there is no 
proof that this group would have modified its voting behavior in this manner. 
What is clear from this study, however, is that single issue voters can make a 
difference in close elections, but those voters are hard to identify and 
quantify . 
As with the 1972, 1974, and 1978 elections, there is no evidence of a 
clear relationship between Lutheran church membership and 1980 voting 
behavior in the Culver-Grassley contest. 
% Lutherans 
0-14 (n=33) 
15-29 (n=37) 
30-44 (n=20) 
45-71 (n=9) 
Table 21. 
Change in the Percentage of the Democratic Vote According 
to the Percentage of Lutherans in Iowa Counties, 197 4-1980 
% Dem. 1974 % Dem. 1980 Absolute Change Relative Change 
49.5 44.4 -5.1 -10 
47.7 38.2 -9.5 -20 
50.6 41.5 -9.1 -18 
48.0 36.4 -11.6 -24 
An interesting point to consider in the Culver/Grassley election is the fact 
that the most Lutheran counties deserted Culver in larger numbers than did 
counties with relatively small Lutheran populations as can be seen in the table 
below. Note as well that the -24 % relative loss almost reached the levels of 
9
°Flansburg, "Iowa Voters Join Surge," 4 (A). 
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the relative loss in the most Catholic counties. A possible explanation for this 
huge relative percentage decrease is the large number of heavily Lutheran 
counties located in Grassley's Third District, an area where he dominated 
Culver. 
conclusion 
The political and emotional setback suffered by the Iowa Democratic 
Party hierarchy and its activists as a result of the defeats of Clark and Culver 
in the 1978 and 1980 elections, coupled with the loss of majority control in 
both houses of the Iowa General Assembly, left many party loyalists wondering 
whether or not the success of the party and its candidates in the 1960s and 
1970s was simply a temporary phenomenon. Later events would indicate that 
that line of thinking was not correct. The Democratic Party in Iowa, by the end 
of the 1970, had achieved too much through superior organization (voter 
identification and get-out-the-vote programs) to return to the days of being 
the GOP's perennial punching bag. Indeed, the 1980s would show that the Iowa 
Democratic Party would rebound and be victorious in many county, state, and 
national races. 
At the same time, the defeats of Clark and Culver produced attempts 
within the party at the time to better understand the reasons for the two 
candidates' lack of success in winning second terms. Inevitably, this led to 
talk of similarities between the types of persons Clark and Culver were 
ideologically when compared to their two conservative opponents, Jepsen and 
Grassley. One major weakness in simply looking at the two races as two 
liberals being replaced by two conservatives in a period of apparently 
increasing conservatism in the country is that this approach failed to take into 
46 
account the striking differences in the situational contexts surrounding the 
two men and their political careers. This study has suggested that the two 
sets of races were similar in limited respects but strikingly different in 
others. 
This study has also attempted to determine the relationships, if any, 
between voting behavior and various demographic characteristics. Through this 
type of empirical analysis, the author found that a plausible explanation for the 
victories of Jepsen and Grassley are that they did a good job of prying away 
some of Clark's and Culver's natural bases of power, such as Catholics, 
Germans, and those Living in the state's urban areas. The abortion issue, at 
least in 1978, also played a role. Although this type of study cannot 
conclusively show the reasons for the election or defeat of either candidate, it 
can point to possible, or even probable, reasons. 
Clark's victory in 1972 over Jack Miller was definitely a surprise because 
Clark was virtually unknown in many parts of the state, he had to compete in 
the Nixon landslide year, and he was running against a two-term senator who 
had won by a relatively wide margin in 1966. Likewise, Clark's defeat in 1978 
was also a surprise because he had been held in such high esteem by his fellow 
Iowans, according to a variety of Iowa Polls taken throughout his term. In 
addition, Clark ran against an opponent, Roger Jepsen, who had only lukewarm 
support from members of his own party, especially from those within the 
moderate wing of the state's GOP led by Governor Robert Ray. Indeed, it was 
widely believed at the time of his announcement that Jepsen's time in the Iowa 
political spotlight had come and gone. In spite of his apparent advantages, 
Clark lost to Jepsen in a race that may have hinged on Jepsen's ability to 
attract enough single-issue voters to band together in an anti-Clark coalition. 
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The two elections involving Culver were held in very different 
circumstances. In 1974, Culver, already an immensely popular member of the 
U.S. House of Representatives from Iowa's Second Congressional District, ran 
for an open seat held by Harold Hughes, a member of his own party. In addition, 
the Watergate scandal and the downfall of the Republican President made 
Culver's electoral chances much better. Finally, Culver's opponent, David 
Stanley, was only fairly well-known throughout the state (certainly not as 
well-known as Clark's first opponent, Miller) and had already been unsuccessful 
in a previous try to win a seat in the U.S. Senate. Despite all of these 
advantages, Culver only beat Stanley by the barest of margins, not even coming 
close to equaling the impressive showing of Clark two years earlier. 
Unlike Clark, Culver failed to increase his own popularity during his six 
years in the Senate. This failure of Culver to solidify his position in public 
opinion polls made him easy prey for Charles Grassley, himself an immensely 
successful member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Iowa's Third 
Congressional District. The stories of both Clark and Culver, aside from being 
interesting portraits of two of the state's (and the Iowa Democratic Party's) 
most important political leaders in the second half of the Twentieth Century, 
help us to better understand the nature of Iowa politics during the 1970s, a 
volatile and exiting time in the state's history. 
11. Buena Vista 
12.Butler 
13. Calhoun 
14. Carroll 
15. Cass 
16. Cedar 
17. Cerro Gordo 
18. Cherokee 
19. Chickasa\t/ 
20. Clarke 
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Map 1. 
Iowa's 99 Counties 
21. Clay 4 1. Hancock: 61. Madison 
22. Clayton 42. Hardin 62 . Mahaska 
23. Clinton 43. Harrison 63. Marion 
24. Cra\t/ford 44. Henry 64. Marshall 
25. Dallas 45. Ho\t/ard 65. Mills 
26. Davis 46. Humboldt 66. Mitchell 
27. Decatur 47. Ida 67. Monona 
28. Dels\t/are 48. lo\t/a 68. Monroe 
2 9. Des Moi nes 49. Jackson 69. Montgomery 
30. Dickinson 50. Jasper 70 . Muscatine 
31. Dubuque 51. Jefferson 71. O'Brien 
32. Emmet 52. Johnson 72. Osceola 
33. Fayette 53 . Jones 73. Page 
34. Floyd 54. Keokuk 74. Palo Alto 
35. Frank:li n 55. Kossuth 75. Plymouth 
36. Fremont 56. Lee 7 6. Pocahontas 
37. Greene 57.Linn 77.Polk: 
38. Grundy 58. Louisa 78. Potta\t/attamie 
39. Guthrie 59. Lucas 79. Po\t/eshiek 
40 . Hami lton 60. Lyon 80. Ringgold 
81. Sac 
82 . Scott 
83. Shel by 
84. Sioux 
85. Story 
86. Tama 
87. Taylor 
88 . Union 
89. Van Buren 
90. Wapello 
91 . Warren 
92. Washington 
93. Wayne 
94. Webster 
95. Winnebago 
96. Winneshiek: 
97. Woodbury 
98. Worth 
99 . Wright 
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Map 2. 
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties 
for Cl ark-Mill er 1972 Election 
D31 .6-39.9% Democratic ~ 50.1-59.9% Democratic (N=7) ~ (N=64) 
~ 40-49.9% Democratic 60-70.5% Democratic 
~(N=19) (N=9) 
Source: L. Dale Ahern, ed ., lo'w'a Official Register, 1973-1974 Vol. 55 (Des Moines, lo'w'a : The Stete of 
lo'wa, 1973), 163-164. 
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Map 3. 
Relative Change in the Democratic Percentage of the 
U.S . Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1966-1972 
D 20-39 .9 percentage ~ 60- 79.9 percentage increase ( N=35) ~increase ( N= 18) 
~ 40-59 .9 percentage 80-99 percentage 
~increase ( N=42) increase ( N=4) 
Source : L. Dale Ahern, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1973-1974 Vol. 55 (Des Moines, Iowa: The State of 
Iowa, 1973), 163-1 64. Also Betty L. Lamberto, ed., Iowa Official Register, 196 7-1968 Vol . 52 ( Des 
Moines, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1967), 411-412. 
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Map 4. 
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties 
for State Audi tor's Race, 1972 
D 20.7-39.9% Democratic (N=61) 
~ 40-49.9% Democratic 
~ (N=35) 
~ 50-59.9% Democratic 
~(N=3) 
60% or more Democratic 
(N=O) 
Source: L. Dale Ahern, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1973-1974 Vol. 55 (Des Moines, Iowa: The State of 
Iowa, 1973), 168-169. 
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Map 5. 
Democratic Percentage of the Vole in Iowa Counties 
for Cl ark-Jepsen 1 9 7 8 El e cl i on 
D 25.2-39.9% Democratic ~ 50.1-59.9% Democratic (N=17) ~(N=22) 
~ 40-49.9% Democratic 60-67% Democratic 
~(N=59) (N=l) 
Source: The State of lows, Cenve,, of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978 (De, Moine,, lows: The 
State of Iowa, 1978), n.p. 
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Map 6. 
Rel alive Change in the Democratic Percentage of the 
U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978 
D 0-7 percentage increase ( N=5) 
~ 1-15 percentage 
~decrease (N=54) 
~ 16-29 percentage 
~decrease (N=36) 
30-38 percentage 
decrease ( N=4) 
Source: L. Dale Ahern, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1973-1974 Vol. 55 (Des Moines, Iowa: The State of 
Iowa, 1973), 163- 164. Also The State of Iowa, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978 
( Des Moines, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1 978), n.p. 
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Map 7. 
Absolute Change in the Democratic Percentage of the 
U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1972-1978 
D 0.0-3.2 point gain (N=5) 
~ 0.9-6.0 point loss 
~(N=36) 
~ 6.1-12.0 point loss 
~(N=39) 
12.1-19.9 point loss 
(N=18) 
Source: L. Dale Ahern, ed., low'a omcial Register, 1973-1974 Vol. 55 ( Des Moines, low'a: The State of 
low'a, 1973), 163-164. Also The State of low'a, Canvass of the Vote: General Election November 7, 1978 
( Des Moines, low'a: The State of low'a, 1978), n.p. 
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Map 8. 
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties 
for State Auditor's Race, 1978 
D 17.7-39 .9% Democratic ~ 50-59.9% Democrat;c (N=53) ~(N=6) 
~ 40-49.9% Democrat;c 60-62.8% Democratk 
~(N=39) (N=l) 
Source: The State of lo'vla, Canvass of the Vote: General Electfon November 7, 1978 (Des Mo;nes, lo'vla: The 
State of lo'vla, 1978) , n.p. 
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Map 9. 
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties 
for Culver-Stanley 1974 Election 
D 27.3-39.9% Democratic ~ 50.1-59.9% Democratic (N=l 1) ~ (N=42) 
~ 40-49.9% Democratic 60-68.9% Democratic 
~ (N=41) (N=S) 
Source: Pam Peglow, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1975-1976 Vol. 56 ( Des Moines, Iowa: The State of 
Iowa, 1 975), 1 60- 1 61. 
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Map 10. 
Rel alive Change in the Democratic Percentage of the 
U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 1968-1974 
D 13-27 percentage ~ 0-11.9 percentage decrease ( N=2) ~increase ( N=51) 
~ 1-12.9 percentage 12-24 percentage 
~ decrease ( N=27) ; ncrease ( N= 19) 
Source: Pam Peglo\tl, ed., lo\tla Official Register, 1975-1976 Vol. 56 ( Des Moines, lo\tla: The State of 
lo\tla, 1975), 160- 161. Also L. Dale Ahern, ed ., lo\tla Official Register, 1 969- 1 970 Vol . 53 ( Des 
Moines,lo\tla: TheStateoflo\tla, 1969), 351-352. 
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Map 11 . 
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties 
for State Auditor's Race, 197 4 
) ~~~ ~~~~ I ~ ~ ~~~~~ ~~~~ ~ ~ ~ \___ ~ ~~~~~ ~~ -~11~~11~~ ~~ -~-~~~~~~I~~. 
~~~~-~~~~- ~ 
- ~~~~ ~ ·~ 
, ~ ~~~- r 
I~ ~~~~ ~ 
D 23-39.9% Democratic (N=34) 
~ 40-49.9% Democratic 
~(N=56) 
~50-59.9% Democratic 
~(N=9) 
60% or more Democratic 
(N=O) 
Source: Pam Peglow, ed ., Iowa Official Register, 1975- 1976 Vol. 56 ( Des Moines, Iowa: The State of 
Iowa, 1975), 166- 167. 
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Map 12. 
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties 
for Culver-Grassl ey 1980 Election 
D 20.7-39.9% Democratic (N=48) 
~ 40-49.9% Democratic 
~(N=38) 
~ 50.1-59.9% Democratic 
~(N=12) 
60- 68.1 % Democratic 
( N= 1) 
Source: Mary Ellen Gautchier, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1981-1982 Vol . 59. ( Des Moines, Iowa: The 
State of Iowa, 1981), 146-147. 
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Map 13. 
Relative Change in the Democratic Percentage of the 
U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 197 4-1980 
D 1- 1 2 percentage ; ncrease ( N=8) 
~ 1-15 percentage 
~decrease (N=36) 
~ 16-29 percentage 
~ decrease (N=41) 
30-41 percentage 
decrease ( N= 1 4) 
Source: Mart) Ellen GautcMer, ed., Iowa omdal Regfater, 1981-1982 Vol. 59. ( Des Mo;nes, Iowa: The 
State of Iowa, 1981), 146- 1 47. Also Pam Peglow, ed., Iowa omc;a1 Regfater, 1 975- 1976 Vol. 56 ( Des 
Mo; nes, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1 9 75), 1 60- 1 61 . 
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Map 14. 
Absolute Change in the Democratic Percentage of the 
U.S. Senate Vote in Iowa Counties, 197 4-1980 
D 0.0-5.1 point gain (N=B) 
~ 0.9-6.0 pointloss 
~ (N=26) 
~ 6.1-12.0 point loss 
~(N=38) 
12.1- 22.0 point loss 
(N=27) 
Source: Mary Ellen Gautchier, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1 981 - 1 982 Vol. 59. ( Des Moines, Iowa: The 
State of Iowa, 1981), 146-147. Also Pam Peglow, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1975-1976 Vol. 56 ( Des 
Moines, Iowa: The State of Iowa, 1975), 1 60-161. 
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Map 15. 
Democratic Percentage of the Vote in Iowa Counties 
in Presidential Race, 1980 
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D 20-39.9% Democratic (N=47) 
~ 40- 49. 9% Democratic 
~ (N=48) 
~ 50-59. 9% Democratic 
~(N=4) 
60% or more Democratic 
(N=O) 
Source: Mary Ellen Gautchier, ed ., Iowa Official Register, 1 981-1982 Vol. 59. ( De, Moine,, Iowa: The 
State of Iowa, 1981), 144- 1 45. 
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Map 16. 
Percentage of Population Classified as "Urban" 
for Iowa Counties, 1980 
D 0-22.9% (N=23) ~ 46-68.9% (N=l 9) 
~23-45.9% (N=44) 69-92.1% (N=13) 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of PoP.ulation, 1980, part 17, 
General PoP.ulation Characteristics: Iowa (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), 17-17 
to 17-18and 17-232to 17-240. 
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Map 17. 
German-Born Population of Iowa Counties, 1885 
D 0-4% of county's total ~ 1 0-14% of county's total 1 885 population ( N=47) ~ 1 885 population ( N= 1 4) 
~ 5-9% of county's total 15% or more of county 's 
~ 1885 population (N=31) totel 1885 pop . (N=7} 
Source: The State of lo'w'e, Census of lo'w'e for the Veer 1885 (Des Moines, lo'w'e : The Stete of lo'w'e, 1885}, 
164-166. 
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Map 18. 
Catholics as a Percentage of Total Church Members 
in Iowa Counties, 1980 
D 4-14% (N=30) 
~ 15-29% 
~ (N=37) 
~ 30-44% 
~ (N=24) 
45-81 % 
(N=8) 
Source: National Council of Churches of Christin the U.S.A., Churches end Church Membershi P. in the United 
States, 1980: An Enumeration by~gion, State, end County Based on Date ReP.orted by 111 Church Bodies 
(Atlante, Georgi 8 : GlenmHy Research Council, 1 982}, 1 02-111 . 
D 0-14% (N=33) 
~ 15-29% 
~(N=37) 
~30-44% 
~ (N=20) 
45-71 % 
(N= 9) 
. . n the United h Membersh1 P. 1 
Churches end Churc 111 Church Bodies f Christin the U.S.A., don Dete ReP.o ted by ·1 of Churches o d County B~es ~-. el Counc1 . Stete, e .. n, .. " ............... Source : Net1on eretion by Reg1on,_ 82) 1 02- 111. o An Enum ·1 19 , Stetes, 1 98 : ry Reseerch Counc1 , 
- ie· Glenme (Atlente, Georg . 
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Map 20. 
Methodists as a Percentage of Total Church Members 
in Iowa Counties, 1980 
D 3-14% (N=20) 
~15-26% 
~(N=47) 
~27-387' 
~(N=23) 
39-567' 
(N=9) 
Source: National Council of Churches of Christin the U.S.A., Churches and Church Membershi P. in the United 
States, 1 980: An Enumeration by~gion, State, end County Based on Date ReP.orted by 111 Church Bodies 
(Atlante, Georgie: Glenmary Research Council, 1982), 1 02-111. 
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